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HE corporate law issues addressed by Texas courts1 during this
Survey period2 can be grouped into three broad categories: (a) the
liability of corporate officers, directors and shareholders for (i) the
actions of the corporation with which they are affiliated, or (ii) their own
actions on behalf of the corporation with which they are affiliated; (b) the
law of "successor liability;" and (c) contract construction and interpreta-
tion issues of special interest to the corporate practitioner, including is-
sues related to contract formation and the interplay between the sanctity
of contract and the tort of fraudulent inducement.3
II. LIABILITY OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS AND
SHAREHOLDERS OF TEXAS CORPORATIONS
Despite frequent pronouncements by Texas courts that the corporate
form is not to be easily avoided or ignored,4 Texas courts have manifested
a reluctance to unequivocally afford corporate officers, directors and
shareholders the basic protections of that corporate form: namely, free-
dom from liability for the obligations of the corporation with whom the
corporate officers, directors and shareholders are affiliated-protection
that has always been the most "fundamental" purpose for the formation
1. Like each of the three prior Corporations Surveys, for the purpose of this article,
"Texas courts" includes not qnly the decisions of the Texas appellate courts and the Texas
Supreme Court, but also decisions by the federal district or bankruptcy courts situated
within Texas and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to the extent
interpreting Texas law. Because the scope of this article is limited to a survey of Texas
corporate law issues and because another survey article will specifically address such issues
for this Survey period, federal or Texas cases discussing securities law issues are not
discussed.
2. The Survey period is October 1, 2001 through November 1, 2002, although later
cases are included to the extent they were available before the publication date.
3. The Texas courts also addressed a number of other corporate law issues during this
Survey period, but the cases were of less significance. See, e.g., In re Miller, 290 F.3d 263,
269 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that in the absence of any express indemnity provision,
corporation statutes govern, and because the officer was sued predominantly because of
activity he undertook to obtain employment, which was for his own personal benefit, the
corporation is not required to indemnify the officer); Swain v. Wiley Coll., 74 S.W.3d 143(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (effect of board ratification of otherwise unautho-
rized contract of corporation and persons entitled to challenge noncompliance with by-
laws); Landon v. S & H Mktg. Group, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, no
pet.) (review of Texas law of director's and officer's fiduciary duties of obedience, loyalty,
and due care and the Texas interested director statute-Article 2.35 of the Texas Business
Corporations Act); Baty v. ProTech Ins. Agency, 63 S.W.3d 841, 852-53 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); Anderson Chem. Co. v. Green, 66 S.W.3d 434, 442 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (officers and employees of corporations have a duty sepa-
rate from any written employment agreement not to compete with the corporation and not
to disclose confidential and proprietary information).
4. See generally Glenn D. West & Brandy L. Treadway, Corporations, 55 SMU L.
REV. 803, 804 (2002); Glenn D. West, Corporations, 54 SMU L. REV. 1221, 1222 (2001);
Glenn D. West & Christopher M. Fairman, Corporations, 53 SMU L. REV. 773, 774 (2000).
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of the corporate entity5 and protection that was specifically confirmed
and enhanced by the Texas legislature in Article 2.21 of the Texas Busi-
ness Corporations Act.6
It is clearly acknowledged 7 that Article 2.21 was originally amended in
1989 in specific response to the Texas Supreme Court's infamous decision
in Castleberry v. Branscum,8 wherein the court seemingly extended the
basic concept of piercing the corporate veil beyond circumstances where
the corporation had been used to perpetrate a fraud, to any circumstance
in which "recognizing the separate corporate existence would bring about
an inequitable result."9 Article 2.21, as amended, was specifically in-
tended to overturn the business uncertainty created by Castleberry as to
the limited liability afforded by the Texas corporate form, particularly in
the context of corporate contractual obligations and tort claims arising
therefrom. 10 Through subsequent amendments to Article 2.21 in 1993
and 1997, Article 2.21 was further clarified and expanded in an attempt to
"curb the creativity of the bench and [the] bar""1 in ignoring the plain
import of the statute that unequivocally makes shareholders, share-
holder's affiliates and affiliates of the corporation unavailable as sources
of repayment for contractual obligations of the corporation or torts aris-
ing from those contractual obligations. 12 Corporations Surveys in the
past have noted a number of cases that were ripe for decision on the basis
of Article 2.21, but in which the existence of Article 2.21 or its clear im-
port was ignored by the Texas courts. 13 That trend has continued during
this Survey period.
There are basically four ways in Texas in which officers, directors or
shareholders can subject themselves to individual liability to third parties
dealing with the corporation: (1) executing agreements on behalf of the
corporation without clearly identifying their capacity as agents of the cor-
poration rather than as individuals;1 4 (2) taking an action that is pre-
scribed by statute and that expressly subjects individual actors to
5. Gregory W. Wix, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Michigan Consider Statutory
Solutions?, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 637 (2002); James Gerard Gaspard, II, A Texas
Guide to Piercing and Preserving the Corporate Veil, 31 BULL. L. SEC. ST. B. TEX. 24, 25(1994); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985).
6. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon 2003).
7. Brent Lee, Veil Piercing and Actual Fraud Under Article 2.21 of the Texas Business
Corporation Act, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 427, 430-31 (2002).
8. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
9. Id. at 272-73. See also Lee, supra note 7.
10. See Lee, supra note 7; Wix, supra note 5, at 648; Gaspard, supra note 5, at 33.
11. Alan W. Tompkins & Ted S. O'Neal, Corporations and Limited Liability Compa-
nies, 51 SMU L. REV. 817, 825 (1998).
12. See Lee, supra note 7, at 433; Gaspard, supra note 5, at 33-35; TEX. Bus. CORP.
Acr ANN. art. 2.21 cmt. (Vernon 2003).
13. West, supra note 4, at 1226-30; West & Treadway, supra note 4, at 809-16. See also
Mike Tankersley, What If They Made a Law and No One Noticed?, TEXAS LAWYER, Dec.
16, 1996, at 33; Gaspard, supra note 5, at 38-39.
14. See, e.g., Taylor-Made Hose, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 21 S.W.3d 484 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2000, pet. denied).
2003] 1397
SMU LAW REVIEW
individual liability, regardless of the fact that the action was taken on
behalf of and even at the direction of the corporation; 15 (3) committing
an intentional tort' 6 or a negligent tort in circumstances where an individ-
ual duty of reasonable care is owed, 17 such as driving a car on behalf the
corporation, even if the tort was committed on behalf of or at the direc-
tion of the corporation; 18 and (4) traditional "piercing the corporate veil
analysis," whether in the form of the alter ego theory or the single busi-
ness enterprise theory, or in the form of the partnership-like theory of
joint enterprise.' 9 Article 2.21 does not apply to the first two categories
noted above, and it applies to the last two categories only insofar as the
liability sought to be imposed on the individual is liability for a contrac-
tual obligation of the corporation or a tort arising out of a contractual
obligation of the corporation.
Unlike prior Survey periods, the first means of imposing individual lia-
bility-executing agreements on behalf of the corporation without clearly
identifying the agent capacity in which an officer, director or shareholder
was so executing the agreement-did not present itself in any meaningful
decisions during this Survey period. However, the Fifth Circuit did have
occasion to reaffirm that a corporate officer or director, as an agent of the
corporation, is an individual separate and apart from the corporation, and
where that agent signs a contract as an agent of the corporation only, "he
does not thereby bind himself personally to the agreement."120 Similarly,
although there were a number of cases that addressed the fourth means
of imposing liability-the traditional alter ego, single business enterprise
and joint enterprise doctrines 2' -none of these cases were remarkable.
15. See, e.g., Love v. State, 972 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
16. See, e.g., Rosales v. Am. Buslines, Inc., 598 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Lee, 847 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993,
no writ).
18. See, e.g., Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1996). See also Kingston v.
Helm, 82 S.W.3d 755, 762 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied); Gaspard, supra
note 5, at 35.
19. See, e.g., Nichols v. Pabtex, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 2d 772 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
20. Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 667 (5th Cir. 2002). See also Pabich v. Kellar, 71
S.W.3d 500 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied). Similarly, the opposite is also true
that while the actions of a corporate officer on behalf of the corporation are presumed to
be the corporation's actions, "an agent who steps outside the boundaries of his authority
acts independently and not on behalf of the corporation." Mars, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 71
S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied). See also Brown & Root, Inc. v.
Moore, 92 S.W.3d 848 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet filed); Ehrhardt v. Elec. & Instru-
mentation Unlim. of Louisiana, 220 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D. Tex. 2002); Hall v. Diamond
Shamrock Ref. Co., 82 S.W.3d 5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. granted); R & R
Contractors v. Torres, 88 S.W.3d 685, 708 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) ("A
corporation may not be held liable for punitive damages for gross negligence unless the
corporation itself commits gross negligence, authorized or ratified an agent's gross negli-
gence, was grossly negligent in hiring an unfit agent, or committed gross negligence
through the actions or inactions of a vice-principal.").
21. See, e.g., Central De Fianzas, S.A. v. Bridgefarmer & Assocs., No. CA 3:01-CV-
1841-R, 2002 WL 1477444 (N.D. Tex. July 5, 2002); Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. V &
P Enters., Inc., No. 3:02-CV-0401-L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5328 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2002);
United States v. North Am. Constr. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 601, 643-44 (S.D. Tex. 2001);
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The Texas decisions addressing the second and third means of imposing
liability on individuals acting on behalf of a corporation during this Sur-
vey period were much more significant. Because Article 2.21 specifically
provides that it does not override any other statutory imposition of indi-
vidual liability,22 Article 2.21 is not applicable to the second means of
imposing liability on individual agents of the corporation, i.e., express
statutorily imposed liability.23 But contrary to a decision by the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals during this Survey period, 24 the authors believe
that Article 2.21 clearly applies to the third means of imposing liability on
individuals-individual participation in a tort committed on behalf of the
corporation-as long as the tort complained of arose out of, or relates to,
a contractual obligation entered into on behalf of the corporation by the
individual upon whom liability is sought to be imposed. Thus, this section
of the Survey will begin with an analysis of the cases decided during this
Survey period addressing the second means of imposing individual liabil-
ity on those acting on behalf of a corporation-statutorily imposed liabil-
ity. Next, those cases decided during the Survey period addressing the
third means of imposing liability on individual agents of a corporate en-
tity-personal participation in torts committed on behalf of the corpora-
tion-will be discussed.
A. IMPOSING LIABILITY ON CORPORATE OFFICERS, DIRECTORS OR
SHAREHOLDERS BY STATUTE
1. Imposing Liability for Failure to Pay Franchise Taxes: Williams v.
Adams
Section 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code has long imposed personal lia-
bility on officers and directors of a corporation whose corporate privi-
leges have been forfeited for failing to file a report or pay a tax "for each
debt of the corporation that is created or incurred in [Texas] after the
date on which the report, tax, or penalty is due and before the corporate
BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002); JHC Ventures, L.P. v.
Fast Trucking, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.); In re U-Haul
Int'l, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied); Howell v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 84 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); El Puerto De
Liverpool, S.A. De C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero S.A. De C.V., 82 S.W.3d 622 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. dism'd w.o.j.); Pinebrook Props., Ltd. v. Brookhaven
Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n, 77 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied); Wal-
lace v. Ramon, 82 S.W.3d 501 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.); Hinkle v. Adams,
74 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.); Shaw v. Maddox Metal Works, Inc.,
73 S.W.3d 472 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.).
22. TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac-T ANN. art. 2.21(B)(2) (Vernon 2003). Article 2.21(B)(2)
states that "nothing contained in this article shall limit the obligation of a holder,... or
affiliate to an obligee of the corporation when the holder, . . . or affiliate is otherwise liable
to the obligee for the obligation under this Act or another applicable statute." Id.
23. Id.
24. See Kingston v. Helms, 82 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. de-
nied); discussion infra Part II.B.
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privileges are revived. 25 If applicable, the liability of the corporate of-
ficer or director under the Texas Tax Code is the same "as if the director
or officer were a partner and the corporation were a partnership. '2 6 An
officer or director can escape personal liability for any debt incurred by
the corporation in such circumstances only if the debt was created over
the director's or officer's objection or without his or her knowledge.2 7
The purpose of section 171.255 is to encourage payment of franchise
taxes by punishing an officer or director who allows the corporation to
incur indebtedness while its franchise taxes remain unpaid or its tax re-
ports have not been filed.28
In Williams v. Adams,2 9 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals decided
what it termed a case of first impression in Texas respecting the type of
obligations of the corporation that are covered by the term "debt" under
the Texas Tax Code.30 June and Robert Williams were both officers of
Williams Construction Corporation.31 The plaintiff obtained a judgment
against the corporation for personal injuries she sustained as the result of
the corporation's negligence.32 The judgment was obtained after the cor-
poration's charter had been forfeited for failure to pay franchise taxes. 33
After the entry of the judgment against the corporation, the plaintiff
brought suit against June and Robert Williams individually, as officers of
the corporation, based solely on section 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code.34
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
June and Robert Williams on the basis that all of the conditions set forth
in section 171.255 had been met.35 June and Robert Williams appealed
claiming that (a) section 171.255 does not impose personal liability on
officers of a corporation for debts of that corporation arising from unin-
tentional torts; and (b) even if it does, the liability here was incurred
before, not "after the date on which the report, tax or penalty [was]
25. TEX. TAX CoDE ANN. § 171.255(a) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2003); see also Walter
A. Schroeder, Personal Liability of Officers and Directors for Debts of a Texas Corporation,
25 THE HOUSTON LAWYER 18 (November-December 1987).
26. TEX. TAX CoDE ANN. § 171.255(b) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2003).
27. Id. § 171.255(c). The lack of knowledge element also requires "the exercise of
reasonable diligence" by the director or officer "to become acquainted with the affairs of
the corporation [to the extent it] would not have revealed the intention to create the debt."
Williams v. Adams, 74 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
Technically, the statute refers to officers and directors in the lead-in to § 171.255(c) and
then only refers to directors in the specific sections describing the means of exonerating
oneself from liability. The intent to cover officers in the exoneration provisions of
§ 171.255(c), however, appears clear. But see Schroeder, supra note 25, at 20.
28. See Schwab v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 198 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex. 1946),
cited in Williams, 74 S.W.3d at 440.
29. Williams, 74 S.W.3d 437.
30. Id. at 439.
31. Id. at 438.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 438-39. The negligent act, however, occurred before the corporation for-
feited its charter and privileges and while it was apparently current on its taxes and reports.
Id. at 443.





After addressing the purpose and construction of section 171.255, the
specific statutory language used, and the legislative history, the court con-
cluded that June and Robert Williams were correct in their argument that
the statute does not apply to debts arising from tort judgments based on
negligence. 37 The court reached this conclusion, in large part, because of
the provision of the statute exonerating officers or directors from liability
when they objected to a debt being incurred or did not know that the
debt had been incurred in the exercise of their reasonable obligation to
become familiar with the affairs of the corporation. 38 According to the
court, "[w]hen applied to 'involuntary debts' such as a tort judgment-
especially one predicated on negligence liability-this provision makes
no sense."'39 Rather, "[o]nly by limiting personal liability to debts created
through an actual transaction of business could officers and directors have
a fair and reasonable opportunity to protect themselves against personal
liability by disapproving and disavowing such debts."'40 According to the
court, "failure to adhere to the standards of ordinary prudence" in the
conduct of the business of a corporation "and the resultant tort judgment
that is assessed" is not part of the "general transacting of corporate busi-
ness done by the corporation. '41 Therefore, the court reversed the judg-
ment of the trial court concluding that June and Robert Williams were
not personally liable for the negligence judgment rendered against Wil-
liams Construction Company at a time when the corporation's corporate
privileges had been forfeited for failure to pay franchise taxes.42
2. Imposing Liability on Corporate Officers for Violations of the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Miller v. Keyser
During the last Survey period the Houston Court of Appeals [First Dis-
36. Id. The court did not need to address the second point as to when a liability for
negligence results in an incurred debt because the case was decided on the basis that the
term "debt" as used in the statute was not intended to cover liabilities arising from unin-
tentional torts. Nevertheless, the court did note that had they needed to reach that issue
they would hold that the "debt" "in this case was 'created or incurred' on the date" of the
negligence, not on the subsequent date that the judgment was actually obtained. Id. at 443
n.2.
37. Id. at 442.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 443.
40. Id. (quoting Jonnet v. State, 877 S.W.2d 520, 532 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ
denied) (Jones, J., dissenting)).
41. Id.
42. Id. The court noted that a different result may be realized in cases involving the
administrative assessment of penalties for violations of a statute by a corporation. In those
cases there is an ongoing failure to comply with a specific statutory requirement with which
the officers and directors were in a position to know the corporation was out of compli-
ance. Id. It seems that the court's "distinction between the failure to comply with a statute
and [the] resultant fine that is imposed and the failure to adhere to the standards of ordi-
nary prudence (as in a negligence cause of action), and the resultant tort judgment that is
assessed," could be easily blurred in a case involving a specific course of conduct under-
taken by a corporation which the officers and directors knew or should have known was
being undertaken in a manner that was negligent. Id.
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trict] reached its decision in Keyser v. Miller,43 wherein it was held that a
corporate officer is not personally liable for violations of the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act ("DTPA") unless the corporate officer acted "know-
ingly."'44 We noted in last year's Corporations Survey that "the court [of
appeals] reached this decision notwithstanding that a violation of the
DTPA does not require a finding of intent to deceive. '45 During this
Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision
and held that even an innocent corporate agent without any knowledge of
the falsity of the statements made on behalf of his or her corporation is
personally liable for misrepresentations coming within the purview of the
DTPA.46
The Texas Supreme Court, in Miller v. Keyser,47 reached this result be-
cause the DTPA is explicit in recognizing a corporate officer or agent as a
"person" who may be held liable for false misrepresentations, and the
DTPA does not require, as a condition of imposing liability, that the "per-
son" making the false misrepresentation act knowingly or intentionally. 48
All that is required under the DTPA to hold a corporate officer or agent
personally liable for false misrepresentations made on behalf of a corpo-
ration is that there is evidence that the corporate officer or agent person-
ally made the misrepresentation complained of and that the
"misrepresentation was the producing cause of the consumer's dam-
ages."'49 The only consolation offered by the supreme court to the inno-
cent corporate officer or agent is that the DTPA authorizes statutory
indemnity and contribution from the corporation.50 That is meager com-
fort, however, to the innocent agent "held liable for unknowingly passing
along false company information," particularly if the "indemnification
proves to be not enough protection for agents" because the corporation
proves unable to fulfill its indemnification obligation.51 Noting these
problems, the supreme court nevertheless refused "to judicially create an
exemption that does not exist in the statute for agents acting solely on
behalf of their employers. '52 According to the supreme court, if there
are indeed problems with the statute, "the Legislature can amend the
statute to prevent further mischief. '53 Although not addressed by the
43. Keyser v. Miller, 47 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001), rev'd,
Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. 2002).
44. West & Treadway, supra note 4, at 813-14.
45. Id. at 813.
46. Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. 2002).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 715.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 718.
51. Id. at 719.
52. Id.
53. Id. In another case decided during this Survey period, Cornman v. State Farm
Lloyds, No. H-01-3266, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24472 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2001), the court
similarly found that insurance agents and adjusters are "persons" within the Texas Insur-
ance Code who can be held personally liable for deceptive acts even though committed
solely while acting within the scope of their employment on behalf of the insurance com-
pany. Id. at *1244 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison Contractors, Inc., 966 S.W.2d
1402 [Vol. 56
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supreme court, as noted in last year's Corporations Survey, Article 2.21
does not apply to statutorily imposed liability.
54
B. IMPOSING LIABILITY ON CORPORATE AGENTS FOR THEIR
PERSONAL PARTICIPATION IN A TORT EVEN THOUGH COMMITTED
SOLELY IN THEIR CAPACITY AS A CORPORATE AGENT:
KINGSTON V. HELM
Texas has long recognized that, as a general rule, corporate agents (in-
cluding officers and directors) are individually liable for their own torts
even if committed solely in the scope of their agency on behalf of their
corporation.55 This Survey period was no exception. 56 As noted in last
year's Corporations Survey, however, the authors believe that Article
2.21 is applicable to such torts to the extent the tort is committed in con-
nection with the execution of a corporate contractual obligation and that,
as "affiliates" of the corporation, corporate officers, directors, and share-
holders, enjoy the protections afforded by Article 2.21 in such circum-
stances. 57 Nevertheless, during this Survey period, the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals in Kingston v. Helm58 disagreed with the authors' view
of the protection provided by Article 2.21.
Kingston involved a claim by the plaintiff against an individual defen-
dant for fraud, negligent misrepresentation and violations of the DTPA. 59
The claims arose out of the purchase of a townhome by the plaintiff from
Greenway Development, Inc., the developer of the townhome and the
corporation on whose behalf the defendant was acting as an officer in
entering into the contract to sell the townhome to the plaintiff.60 At trial,
a directed verdict was rendered in favor of Helm, the individual defen-
dant and an officer and shareholder of the corporate defendant, on the
basis that the "evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to find Helm
liable in his individual capacity."'6 1
On appeal, the court first discussed the heretofore confusing line of
cases addressing whether a corporate agent can be held individually liable
482 (Tex. 1998); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 384 (Tex. 2000)). It is
surprising given the similarity of the issues presented under the DTPA and the Insurance
Code that the Texas Supreme Court did not cite these insurance cases in its analysis of the
issues presented under the DTPA in Keyser.
54. See generally West & Treadway, supra note 4, at 814.
55. See id. at 811-16.
56. See, e.g., McCaskey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 562, 577 (S.D. Tex.
2001); Gore v. Scotland Gold, Inc., No. 04-01-00548-CV, 2003 WL 553271, at *4 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio Feb. 28, 2003, no pet.); Hinkle v. Adams, 74 S.W.3d 189,194-95 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.); Robert L. Crill, Inc. v. Bond, 76 S.W.3d 411, 423 (Tex.
App-Dallas 2001, pet. denied); PWS Foods, Inc. v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 05-01-01211-CV
(Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 9, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2508, at *21.
57. See West & Treadway, supra note 4,' at 815-16.
58. Kingston v. Helm, 82 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
59. Id. at 757.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 758.
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for making false misrepresentations under the DTPA solely in his or her
capacity as an agent on behalf of the corporation.62 While that confusing
line of cases has now been clarified by the Texas Supreme Court during
this Survey period in Keyser, as discussed above, 63 Kingston was decided
prior to Keyser. As a result, the Kingston court was forced to weed its
way through the potentially conflicting case law on the issue.64 Without
the benefit of Keyser, the Kingston court nevertheless concluded that an
agent could be held individually liable under the DTPA.65 It reached this
conclusion, however, not on the basis of statutory construction, as the
Texas Supreme Court properly did in Keyser, but on the traditional rule
that corporate agents are always individually liable for their own tortious
actions.66
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals next considered the applicability
of the two recognized exceptions to the general rule imposing liability on
corporate officers who directly participate in a tort on behalf of the cor-
poration.67 Last year's Corporations Survey identified those exceptions
as: "(1) in a negligence case, a corporate officer is not personally liable
for negligence committed in the scope of his or her employment on be-
half of a corporation 'unless he owed an independent duty of reasonable
care to the injured party apart from his employer's duty;' and (2) in a
tortious interference with contract case, 'a corporate officer or director
may not be held liable for inducing the corporation to violate a contrac-
tual obligation as long as he or she acts in good faith on the corporation's
behalf." 68 The Kingston court quickly concluded that neither of those
exceptions applied to a claim of fraud, misrepresentation or a violation of
the DTPA.69
The appeals court then addressed the potential applicability of Article
2.21 to the claims made against the individual defendant. 70 The defen-
dant argued that Article 2.21 "effectively eliminated the individual liabil-
ity for corporate officers and agents who are shareholders in the
corporation absent evidence that the corporation itself was specifically
used for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud. '71 The court did not believe
Article 2.21 could be construed so broadly; rather the court read Article
2.21 as being limited to the fourth category of cases noted above, i.e.,
cases in which a plaintiff sought to actually pierce the corporate veil.72 If
the case does not involve a claim of piercing the corporate veil, according
62. Id. at 759.
63. See supra Part II.A.2.
64. Kingston, 82 S.W.3d at 759-61.
65. Id. at 761.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 761-64.
68. West & Treadway, supra note 4, at 813.
69. Kingston, 82 S.W.3d at 763-64.
70. Id. at 764-67.
71. Id. at 764.
72. Id. at 764-67.
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to this court, then Article 2.21 has no applicability. 73
In reaching this conclusion, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals first
determined that Article 2.21 by its terms only protects "shareholders" or
other owners of the corporation.74 Although the court seemingly ac-
knowledged that in addition to shareholders, Article 2.21 also shields
"any affiliate thereof or of the corporation," the court appeared to ignore
the phrase "affiliate ... of the corporation" and focused exclusively on
the phrase "affiliate thereof [i.e., of the shareholder]. '75 Defining "affili-
ate" as "a person, organization, or establishment associated with another
as a subordinate, subsidiary, or member," the court concluded that the
protections afforded by Article 2.21 are limited "to people who own
shares or have some relationship with one who owns shares in a
corporation." 76
Having thus established that the only class of persons entitled to pro-
tection under Article 2.21 is a shareholder or other person associated
with a shareholder of the corporation, the court next concluded that Arti-
cle 2.21 is explicit in limiting its protection to suits which seek "to impose
individual liability on a corporate shareholder not on the basis of the
shareholder's own actions, but rather on the basis of the shareholder's
mere status as a shareholder. ' 77 The court reaches this conclusion not-
withstanding its quoting of the expansive language of Article 2.21 that
makes clear that the statute is intended to prevent imposition of liability
for corporate obligations (or any matter relating to or arising from those
obligations) on any of the protected persons, whether that liability is
sought to be imposed because the protected person was "the alter ego of
the corporation, or on the basis of actual fraud or constructive fraud, or a
sham to perpetrate a fraud, or similar theory. '78
Finally, the Kingston court then noted that the statute only protects
shareholders against "liability for any contractual obligation of the corpo-
ration or any matter relating to or arising from the [contractual obliga-
tion]."' 79  According to the court, "to define fraud, fraudulent
inducement, fraud in a real estate transaction, negligent misrepresenta-
tion and DTPA claims as 'matters relating to or arising from a corpora-
tion's contractual obligation,' and thus require plaintiffs to meet article
2.21's requirements in order to hold the individual tortfeasor liable ex-
tends the statute beyond its intended and logical reach."' 80 Consequently,
the appellate court reversed the trial court's directed verdict in favor of
the individual defendant, Helm, holding that the plaintiff was "not re-
73. Id.
74. Id. at 765; see also Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. V & P Enters., No. 3:02-CV-
0401-L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5328, at *12-13 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2002).








quired to meet the standard for piercing the corporate veil set forth in
article 2.21 in order to impose personal liability upon Helm ... [because]
we do not believe that article 2.21 was intended to insulate corporate
agents from individual liability for their own tortious conduct." 81
Contrary to the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals' analysis, the authors
believe that Article 2.21 does indeed apply to corporate officers and di-
rectors, as "affiliate[s] . . .of the corporation," as well as to sharehold-
ers. 82 Article 2.21 applies to "[a] holder of shares, an owner of any
beneficial interest in shares, or a subscriber for shares whose subscription
has been accepted, or any affiliate thereof or of the corporation.'83 An
officer (at least a senior officer) or director of a corporation, particularly
one who also owns significant stock of the corporation, should certainly
be considered an affiliate of the corporation,84 though not necessarily of
any individual shareholder. Certainly the common definition of "affili-
ate" as "a person controlled by or under common control with the other
person" 85 is generally believed to encompass at least executive officers
and certainly board members86 and is not limited to shareholders; other-
wise there would be no need for the addition of the phrase "or of the
corporation." The Kingston court's own definition of "affiliate", when
applied to the corporation as opposed to the shareholders, would clearly
cover officers and directors-both are persons "associated with [the cor-
poration] as a subordinate," because corporate officers and directors,
when undertaking duties on behalf of their corporations, are specifically
required by Texas law to subordinate their personal interests by not al-
lowing those "interests to prevail over [those] of the corporation. '87
Similarly, Article 2.21 cannot be read as only applying to suits seeking
to impose liability on a shareholder arising solely as a result of his or her
"mere status as a shareholder." The statute would hardly have been nec-
essary if that was the case because even under Castleberry, a shareholder
is not held liable based on his or her "mere status" as such, but rather on
the basis of his or her conduct in using the corporation. 88 As noted by the
81. Id. at 766-67.
82. See also West & Treadway, supra note 4, at 815-16.
83. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.21(A) (Vernon 2003) (emphasis added).
84. See, e.g., TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 101.003(2)(E) (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2003);
Camina Servs., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 816 F. Supp. 1533, 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1992). Indeed, the
common definition of "affiliate" is a person who is "closely associated with another."
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 61 (9th ed. 1987). See also Herman v.
United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 59 N.W.2d 475, 478 (Wis.
1953) (The word "affiliate" "literally means a close association").
85. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 79b(a)(11) (West Supp. 2002); see also TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr
ANN. art. 13.02(A)(1) (Vernon 2003).
86. See J. WILLIAM HICKS, RESALE OF RESTRICTED SECURITIES 101 (2003) ("A per-
son who serves as a director or executive officer for a corporation ... is a strong candidate
for affiliate status").
87. Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719 (5th Cir. 1984).
88. See Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex. 1986); see also Sutton v.
Reagan & Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828, 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
("whether or not a shareholder will be insulated from personal liability should depend on
the use, or misuse, which that shareholder is making of the corporate form").
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Texas Supreme Court in Castleberry: "The corporate form normally insu-
lates shareholders, officers, and directors from liability for corporate obli-
gations; but when these individuals abuse the corporate privilege, courts
will disregard the corporate fiction and hold them individually liable." 89
Indeed, Article 2.21 is explicit in applying to any suit which seeks to hold
one of the protected classes of persons liable "on the basis that the
holder, owner, subscriber, or affiliate is or was the alter ego of the corpo-
ration, or on the basis of actual fraud or constructive fraud, a sham to
perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory."90
For the same reason, Article 2.21 cannot be read as being limited only
to cases involving piercing the corporate veil despite the general acknowl-
edgement that the statute was originally enacted in direct response to
Castleberry.91 If that were the case, why refer to "alter ego" completely
separate from "actual fraud or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a
fraud, or other similar theory?" The phrase "or other similar theory"
does not relate only to alter ego-a piercing the corporate veil theory-
but to "actual fraud," "constructive fraud," and "a sham to perpetrate a
fraud." Remember, too, that the statute was amended twice to further
expand its coverage after its original enactment in response to
Castleberry.92
Finally, to accept the court's conclusion that "fraud, fraudulent induce-
ment, fraud in a real estate transaction and negligent misrepresentation"
are not intended to be covered by the statute, to the extent these causes
of action arise in the context of a contractual obligation of a corporation,
requires one to simply ignore the plain words in the statute. 93 Article
2.21 clearly and unequivocally covers any of the protected class of per-
sons from liability for "any contractual obligation of the corporation or
any matter relating to or arising from the obligation. '94 Furthermore,
Article 2.21 declares that the liability of the protected class of persons
covered by the statute for the obligations covered by the statute "is exclu-
sive and preempts any other liability imposed on [such person] for that
obligation under common law or otherwise. '95 With respect to fraudu-
89. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 271.
90. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art 2.21(A)(2) (Vernon 2003) (emphasis added).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
92. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
93. See Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Baker, 87 S.W.3d 526, 529 (Tex. 2002) (court construes "a
statute, 'first by looking to the plain and common meaning of the statute's words'"); R & R
Contractors v. Torres, 88 S.W.3d 685, 700 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) ("The
court is bound to construe a statue as written and, if possible, ascertain the legislative
intent from the language used in the statute."). As noted previously, the authors do agree
with the court's conclusion that suits under the DTPA do not come within the purview of
Article 2.21, because by its express terms, Article 2.21 does not apply to any liability other-
wise imposed on a member of the protected class of persons by "another applicable stat-
ute." TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21(B)(2) (Vernon 2003).
94. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21(A)(2) (Vernon 2003).
95. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21(B) (Vernon 2003). The exclusivity of the
liability of the protected person under Article 2.21 does not however apply when: "(1) the
holder, owner, subscriber, or affiliate has expressly assumed, guaranteed, or agreed to be
personally liable to the obligee for the obligation; or (2) the holder, owner, subscriber, or
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lent inducement in particular, and as noted by the Texas Supreme Court
in Haase v. Glazner,96 "[f]raudulent inducement... is a particular species
of fraud that arises only in the context of a contract and requires the
existence of a contract as part of its proof. '97 Similarly, the Texas Su-
preme Court held during this Survey period that the determination of
whether there had been fraudulent inducement in connection with a con-
tract that was subject to arbitration must itself be arbitrated pursuant to
the terms of that contract since the issue of whether there had been
fraudulent inducement was a matter that "arose under or was related" to
the contract. 98 The authors believe that fraud, fraudulent inducement
and negligent misrepresentation, when committed by a corporate officer
or director in connection with a contractual obligation being entered into
by a corporation and in furtherance of and within the scope of the duties
of such officer or director on behalf of the corporation, are all "matter[s]
relating to or arising from the obligation" as specifically contemplated by
Article 2.21.99 To hold otherwise vitiates the clear purpose of Article 2.21
in protecting corporate officers, directors and shareholders from individ-
ual liability for actions taken on behalf of the corporation in connection
with a contractual obligation of the corporation, regardless of the theory
on which that liability may be based-unless the plaintiff can prove that
the individual officer, director or shareholder "caused the corporation to
be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual
fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit of [such
officer, director or shareholder].' ' 100
III. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
While it is
[t]he well settled rule of American jurisdictions ... that a corpora-
tion which purchases the assets of another corporation does not, by
affiliate is otherwise liable to the obligee for the obligation under this Act or another appli-
cable statute." Id.
96. Haase v. Flazer, 62 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. 2001).
97. Id. at 798.
98. In re J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co., 87 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2002). See also Mat-
thews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50, 54 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding fraudulent induce-
ment claim "relat[ed] to a breach of th[e] Agreement" was subject to arbitration).
99. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art 2.21(A)(2) (Vernon 2003). See Texas-Ohio Gas,
Inc. v. Mecom, 28 S.W.3d 129, 137 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (noting that Arti-
cle 2.21 limits liability for torts, including fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudu-
lent inducement, "relating to or arising from" contractual obligations). See also Nutmeg
Ins. Co. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 229 F. Supp. 2d 668, 684 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (noting
that the words "arising out of" are "broad, general and comprehensive terms effecting
broad coverage"); A & S Council Oil Co. v. Lader, 56 F.3d 234, 240-41 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(when an alleged illegality "could have affected the price of" a contract, then the claims
undoubtedly relate to that contract); Laserdynamics Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., 209 F.R.D.
388 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (discussing the meaning of a forum selection clause requiring that all
"disputes arising out of this agreement" be brought in California); Interface Group-Ne-
vada, Inc. v. Freeman Decorating Co., 473 S.E.2d 573, 575 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that
"arising from" should cover "almost any causal connection or relationship").
100. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art 2.21(A)(2) (Vernon 2003).
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reason of succeeding to the ownership of property, assume the obli-
gations of the transferor [,] ... [e]xceptions to this rule exist where
(a) the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to as-
sume the liabilities of the seller, (b) the transaction amounts to a
consolidation or merger of the two companies, (c) the purchasing
corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation, or (d)
the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape liability.1 1
As noted in a prior Corporations Survey discussing Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Gordon,0 2 the Texas legislature has strengthened the general
rule of "non-liability" in asset purchases by eliminating exceptions (b)
and (c) noted above and strictly limiting exceptions (a) and (d). Specifi-
cally, pursuant to Article 5.10(B)(2) of the Texas Business Corporations
Act, a purchase of all, or substantially all, of the assets of the seller's
corporation "does not make the acquiring [entity] responsible or liable
for any liability or obligation of the selling corporation" unless the acquir-
ing entity assumes the liability or the obligation, or unless another statute
expressly provides to the contrary. 10 3 Therefore, where Texas law con-
trols the issue, only an express assumption of liability or the application
of another statute, such as the fraudulent conveyance statute, would re-
sult in the imposition of liability on a purchaser of assets from a
corporation.10 4
During this Survey period, one federal court had the opportunity to
determine when Texas law was applicable to the issue of successor liabil-
ity. 105 In White v. Cone-Blanchard Corp.,'0 6 the Eastern District of Texas
granted a summary judgment motion for the defendants, Park Corpora-
tion and its subsidiary Cone-Blanchard Corporation. 0 7 The defendant
corporations were sued as the result of an injury the plaintiff allegedly
suffered because of an alleged defect in a Cone-Blanchard Model 11-20
grinding machine that plaintiff was apparently operating at her em-
ployer's plant in Texas. 10 8 The defendant corporations argued that, while
they shared a similar name to and had purchased assets from the corpora-
tion which had designed, manufactured, and sold the allegedly defective
machine, the plaintiff had sued the wrong party.' 0 9 Apparently, the
Cone-Blanchard Machine Company ("CBMC") had manufactured, sold,
and delivered the grinding machine that was the subject of the suit some-
101. Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 566 F.2d 8 (7th Cir. 1977), quoted
in Shapolsky v. Brewton, 56 S.W.3d 120, 136 n.9 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001,
pet. denied).
102. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Gordon, 16 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2000, pet. denied); see West, supra note 4, at 1238.
103. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcTr ANN. art. 5.10(B)(2) (Vernon 2003).
104. See Lockheed, 16 S.W.3d at 139; Int'l Elevator Co. v. Garcia, 76 S.W.3d 778, 782
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
105. See White v. Cone-Blanchard Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 767 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 776.
108. Id. at 769.




In 1997, CBMC became subject to an involuntary bankruptcy proceed-
ing in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the District of Vermont."' As part
of those proceedings, certain assets of CBMC were auctioned, and the
Park Corporation, through its subsidiary, Blanchard-Windsor Corpora-
tion, became the approved buyer of the auctioned assets.112 After the
purchase, Blanchard-Windsor's name was changed to Cone-Blanchard
Corporation ("CBC"). 113 Not all of CBMC's assets were purchased by
CBC, and CBMC apparently emerged from bankruptcy and continued as
a going concern for a number of years."14 In fact, at the time the original
suit was filed, CBMC still existed, but by the time of the appeal, CBMC
had become defunct.' '5 The plaintiff sued both defendants, Park Corpo-
ration and CBC, on the theory that "the circumstances surrounding
[their] asset purchase from CBMC draped [them] with successor liability
with regard to [the] machine."' 16
The defendant corporations argued that Texas law should govern the
issue of whether they were liable as a successor to CBMC, whereas the
plaintiff argued that Vermont law should govern.' 7 The court agreed
with the plaintiff.118 According to the court, while applying the "most
significant relationship" test to the underlying tort claim would clearly
result in the application of Texas law, the "most significant relationship"
test must be applied to each issue in the case separately.' 19 Here, the
issue of whether a successor corporation can be liable for the torts of its
predecessor in the context of an asset acquisition was an entirely separate
issue from the underlying tort action.'20 Applying the "most significant
relationship" test to that issue, the court concluded that Vermont rather
than Texas had the most significant relationship because:
CBMC was a Vermont corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in Windsor, Vermont .... The purchase of CBMC's assets oc-
curred in Vermont and all of the assets purchased were located in
Vermont at the time of purchase. The purchase agreement between
the two companies made Vermont law the choice of law that would
govern the purchase agreement. Texas, on the other hand, would
appear to have little, if anything, to do with the sale of assets from
CBMC to CBC. As such, this court finds Vermont has the most sig-
110. Id. at 769-70.




115. Id. at 770.
116. Id.
117. Id. Obviously, the defendants believed Texas law to be more favorable, as Ver-
mont recognizes all of the traditional exceptions to the general rule of "non-liability" in an
asset purchase.





nificant relationship to the issue of succession. 121
While holding Vermont law was applicable to the determination of
whether successor liability attached to CBC, the court went on to find
that even under Vermont law, CBC was not CBMC's successor.a22
IV. DRAFTING CORPORATE CONTRACTS
A. CONTRACT FORMATION-LETrERS OF INTENT
During this Survey period, the Texas courts continued to decide cases
where the foremost issue was whether an enforceable agreement even
existed. The "common practice ... of using preliminary letters of intent
to outline the basic terms of a corporate acquisition prior to negotiating
the definitive purchase agreement" 123 was first discussed in the Corpora-
tions Survey two years ago as the result of John Wood Group USA, Inc. v.
ICO, Inc.124 In John Wood, a Texas court of appeals, faced with a letter
agreement which "[did] not address all of the terms and conditions which
the parties must agree upon to become binding and consummated" and
which the parties expressly agreed was "not binding,' 25 concluded the
seemingly obvious-that the letter agreement at issue was unenforce-
able.126 However, the John Wood court nevertheless warned that "a
binding contract may be formed if the parties agree on the material
terms, even though they leave open other provisions for later negotia-
tion,"'1 27 and that "a letter of intent may be binding even though it refers
121. Id. A Fifth Circuit case decided under Louisiana choice of law rules during this
Survey period also reached a similar result. See Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, Inc.,
294 F.3d 640 (Sth Cir. 2002).
122. White, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 775. White also contains an interesting discussion of the
meaning of the term "successor." See id. at 772. During this Survey period another Texas
court also considered this issue in a case involving the interpretation of an insurance policy.
See Duke Energy Field Servs. Assets, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 68 S.W.3d 848
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
123. West, supra note 4, at 1233.
124. John Wood Group, USA, Inc. v. ICO, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). See generally West, supra note 4, at 1233-38 (discussing John
Wood in detail).
125. John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at 15. The letter agreement contained the following clause:
Binding Effect. This Letter Agreement constitutes a summary of the princi-
pal terms and conditions of the understanding which has been reached re-
garding the sale of certain assets to Purchaser. It does not address all of the
terms and conditions which the parties must agree upon to become binding
and consummated. The Purchaser, however, does intend to move forward
with its due diligence and expects to expend considerable sums to review the
Sellers' Business. In consideration thereof, the parties have agreed to make
certain covenants of this letter binding upon the parties notwithstanding the
fact that not all details of the transactions have been agreed upon. Accord-
ingly, it is understood and agreed that this letter is an expression of the par-
ties' mutual intent and is not binding upon them except for the provisions
[regarding the covenant to negotiate in good faith, the prohibition on third-
party negotiations, and the agreement of confidentiality].
Id.
126. Id. at 20.
127. Id. at 19 (citing Scott v. Ingle Bros. Pac., Inc., 489 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1972)).
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to the drafting of a future, more formal agreement. 128
In the following year, two cases expanded on John Wood, and both
concluded that the issue of whether a letter of intent is binding can be
difficult to ascertain (in the absence of a clear statement to that effect)
and thus must be left for a jury to determine. 129 Although one letter of
intent did specify that the transaction at issue would be "contingent upon
the execution of" another more comprehensive agreement, it never in-
cluded the explicit statement that the letter was non-binding. 130 The
other letter of intent similarly lacked the phrase "not binding," even
though the letter provided that "subject to [the parties] mutual agree-
ment otherwise, the final documentation of [the] transaction [would] be
based upon the [letter] agreement."' 3 '
This Survey period brought similar issues of whether a preliminary
agreement is enforceable and binding upon the parties. In Bank One,
Texas, N.A. v. Apex Energy, LLC,132 Judge Lynn of the Northern District
of Texas confirmed that there are two distinct lines of case authority in
Texas which determine the enforceability of letters of intent.' 33 One line
concluding that, as a matter of law, a letter of intent is merely an agree-
ment to agree; 134 the other concluding that the question of whether a
letter of intent is an enforceable contract is a fact question for the jury.135
The letter at issue in Bank One stated that "on or before [a certain date],"
128. Id. at 20 (citing Foreca, S.A. v. GRD Dev. Co., 758 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex. 1988)).
129. See Geophysical Micro Computer Applications (Int'l) Ltd. v. Paradigm Geophysi-
cal Ltd., No. 05-98-02016-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 24, 2001, pet. denied) (not desig-
nated for publication), 2001 WL 1270795; Cavalry Invs., L.L.C. v. Sunstar Acceptance
Corp., No. 05-00-00508-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 16, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated
for publication), 2001 WL 371545; see also West and Treadway, supra note 4, at 818-23
(discussing Calvary Investments and Geophysical Micro Computer in detail).
130. Cavalry, 2001 WL 371545, at *7. Specifically, the letter agreement provided that
"[t]he transaction contemplated hereby will be documented by and contingent upon the
execution of a Loan Purchase & Sales Agreement satisfactory to Buyer and Seller." Id. at
*1.
131. Geophysical Micro Computer, 2001 WL 1270795, at *1. The letter agreement at
issue stated:
This transaction will be subject to all necessary corporate approvals, on each
side of the transaction, such other [government] approvals .... satisfactory
completion of due diligence and normal representations, warranties and
other commercial terms as may be necessary or required in connection with a
purchase and sale transaction of this type. Subject to our mutual agreement
otherwise, the final documentation of this transaction will be based upon the
agreement set out herein.
Id.
132. Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Apex Energy, LLC, No. 3:00-CV-2160-M, 2001 WL
1335881 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2001).
133. Id. at *2.
134. See id. (citing Dumas v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 654 F.2d 359, 360 (5th Cir.
1981); Weitzman v. Steinberg, 638 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ);
Southwestern States Oil & Gas Co. v. Sovereign Res., Inc., 365 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex.
App.- Dallas 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
135. Id. (citing Foreca, S.A. v. GRD Dev. Co., 758 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex. 1988); Frank
B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 629 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ




the parties must "enter into a mutually acceptable purchase and sale
agreement.' 36 The federal court noted that none of the cases in which a
court had determined that the binding nature of a letter agreement was to
be determined through a jury had "mutually acceptable" language. 137
Thus, the presence of such language in the Bank One letter instead "con-
firme[d] that future negotiations were envisioned and connotate[d] an un-
derstanding that the agreement was still subject to negotiation. '138 The
court then granted summary judgment to the party who had advocated
that the letter of intent was unenforceable. 139
The San Antonio Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in
Oakrock Exploration Co. v. Killam,140 a case which involved a letter that
purportedly stated the parties mutual understanding regarding certain oil
and gas leases.' 41 However, the crux of the appeals court analysis dif-
fered from the previously discussed cases in that the court heavily relied
on the proposition that "it is only when an essential term is left open for
future negotiation that there is nothing more than an unenforceable
agreement to agree.' 142 Since the subject matter of the letter involved oil
and gas leases, the appeals court sought to determine whether the letter
at issue contained any essential terms specific to oil and gas leases, such
as a lease term, a drilling commencement date, or royalty payment
amounts.143 The court found that the letter did not contain such essential
terms of a typical oil and gas lease, and thus found the letter unenforce-
able as a matter of law. 144
However, in West Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac,145 the Austin Court
of Appeals was not convinced, as a matter of law, that the preliminary
agreement at issue indicated a lack of intent by the contracting parties to
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Dumas, 654 F.2d at 360).
139. Id. at *3.
140. Oakrock Exploration Co. v. Killam, 87 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002,
pet. denied).
141. Id. at 687.
142. Id. at 690 (citing T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 221
(Tex. 1992); Scott v. Ingle Bros. Pac., Inc., 489 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1972); Komet v.
Graves, 40 S.W.3d 596, 602 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.); Texas Oil Co. v. Ten-
neco Inc., 917 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Texas Oil Co., 958 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. 1997).
143. Oakrock Exploration Co., 87 S.W.3d at 690-91. The court also listed the following
as essential terms to an oil and gas lease: time and amount of payments in lieu of drilling
operations and the character, extent and duration of the rights to the oil and gas in place.
Id.
144. Id. at 691; see also Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Schleider, No. 14-01-00969-CV, 2003 WL
124243, at *8 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] January 16, 2003, no pet.) (failure of parties
to agree on length of extension, rate of interest, or amount and number of payments made
purported modification of promissory note unenforceable as matter of law); but see Lerer
v. Lerer, No. 05-02-00124-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 26, 2002, pet. filed) (not designated
for publication), 2002 WL 31656109 (fact that settlement agreement contemplated drafting
of "more formal settlement documents" and the parties continued to negotiate on non-
essential terms does not render agreement unenforceable).
145. West Beach Marina, Ltd., v. Erdeljac, No. 03-01-00475-CV, 2002 WL 31718136
(Tex. App.-Austin Dec. 5, 2002, no pet. h.).
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be bound and thus concluded that the trial court's decision to have a jury
determine the issue of enforceability was correct. 146 West Beach involved
a preliminary settlement agreement which included the following provi-
sion: "The parties recognize that this agreement reflects a summary...
and that there will be additional matters to be resolved.., which [will] be
ultimately reduced to a formal settlement agreement."'1 47 Addressing the
appellant's argument that the preliminary agreement's inclusion of this
language contemplating a latter agreement after further negotiation dem-
onstrates unenforceability, the appeals court emphasized that an enforce-
able agreement can occur even if the parties "agree on certain contract
terms and leave others for later negotiation.' 48 Moreover, after compar-
ing Foreca, S.A. v. GRD Development Co., 14 9 in which the Texas Supreme
Court concluded that the language "subject to legal documentation" did
not conclusively establish a non-binding agreement, 150 with John
Wood,' 5' in which the Houston Court of Appeals concluded that the lan-
guage "not binding" did conclusively establish a non-binding agree-
ment, 152 the Austin Court of Appeals reasoned that the West Beach
Marina language was "more closely analogous to Foreca['s language]" in
that both "lack[ed] an expression of clear intent not to be bound."' 53
Thus, the question of the West Beach Marina parties' intent was "le[ft]
open" and only a jury could decide whether the parties in fact intended to
be bound.1
54
146. Id. at *1, *7.
147. Id. at *4.
148. Id. at *5 (citing T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 221
(Tex. 1992); Scott v. Ingle Bros. Pac., Inc., 489 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1972)). Moreover,
specifically in the context of a settlement agreement, there is "no support... that failure to
settle all disputed issues renders a mediation agreement unenforceable." Id. at *6.
149. Foreca, S.A. v. GRD Dev. Co., 758 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. 1988).
150. See West Beach Marina, 2002 WL 31718139, at *5 (citing Foreca, 758 S.W.2d at
746).
151. John Wood Group USA, Inc. v. ICO, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). See also supra text accompanying notes 123-128 (discussing John
Wood).
152. See West Beach Marina, 2002 WL 31718139, at *5 (citing John Wood, 26 S.W.3d at
15); but cf. Shell Oil Prods. Co. v. Main St. Ventures, L.L.C., 90 S.W.3d 375, 382 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2002, pet. abated) (even though the specific language "non-binding" is ab-
sent, court concludes in dicta that a letter of intent was nevertheless "non-binding" where
it states: (i) "the parties would only become bound if definitive agreements are signed by
them," (ii) only the definitive agreement, "when, as and if executed and delivered, would
have any legal effect," and (iii) "either party may terminate negotiations without incurring
any obligation whatsoever to the other party").
153. West Beach Marina, 2002 WL 31718139, at *6 (emphasis in original). See also Elec-
tronic Bankcard Sys., Inc. v. Retriever Indus., Inc., No. 01-01-00240-CV (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] January 30, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2003 WL
204717, at *5 (conflicting language in letter of intent).
154. See id.; see also NTBS Storage & Retrieval, Inc. v. Kardex Sys., Inc., No. 3:98-CV-
0996-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24606 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2001). In NTBS, the Northern
District of Texas was similarly not convinced that the letter at issue was merely an "agree-
ment to agree" and also concluded that a judicial decision establishing that no contract
existed would be improper. Id. at *12. Although it was undisputed that a formal agree-
ment was never executed, the litigating parties disagreed as to the enforceability of a letter,
which on its face failed to address a certain material term and also expressly contemplated
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The message from all of these cases to the corporate practitioner is
clear: A preliminary agreement contemplating more formal documenta-
tion, or even the negotiation of additional terms and conditions, may be
binding and enforceable, notwithstanding the failure of the parties to
enter into more formal documentation or to negotiate the additional
terms and conditions. 155 If parties intend that such a preliminary agree-
ment not be binding, corporate counsel should so articulate in clear and
explicit terms.156
B. THE SANCTITY OF CONTRACT VS. CLAIMS OF FRAUDULENT
INDUCEMENT: DRC PARTS & ACCESSORIEs, L.L.C.
v. VM MOTORI, S.P.A.
Corporate practitioners rely on the sanctity of the written word when
they negotiate contracts on their clients' behalf. Similarly, corporate at-
torneys rely on documents as written when advising their client on how to
comply with the terms of an agreement. This Survey period, the Texas
courts re-confirmed long-established contract construction principles that
emphasize the sanctity of the contract as written: The primary concern of
a court in construing a written contract is to ascertain the true intent of
the parties as expressed in the instrument. 157 Where contract language is
clear and definite, ambiguity does not exist and a court must apply plain
the negotiation and execution of another, more formal, agreement in the future. Id. at *12-
13. Because the court did not find evidence in the record showing the fact that negotia-
tions had taken place after the letter was written (thereby evidencing an intent that the
existing letter agreement was intended to be binding), the court concluded that a fact issue
existed as to whether the letter constituted a binding agreement. Id. at *16.
155. Applying New York law, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' Adjustrite Sys., Inc.
v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 145 F.3d 543 (2nd Cir. 1998), is particularly instructive as to the
difference between a "binding preliminary agreement" and an "unenforceable agreement
to agree." See generally Thomas C. Homburger & James R. Schueller, Letters of Intent-A
Trap for the Unwary, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 509 (2002).
156. In Papas Telecasting Cos. v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., No. 08-00-00394-CV (Tex.
App.-El Paso, Jan. 17, 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL
59693, another case decided during this Survey period, the El Paso Court of Appeals had
to resolve a dispute as to whether a binding agreement existed. Id. at *4. A letter of intent
for the purchase and sale of a television station had been executed, which specifically pro-
vided that the letter did not constitute a binding agreement, but merely an agreement to
enter into a definitive asset purchase agreement that would include among other docu-
ments, certain schedules and exhibits. Id. at *1. Although the schedules had not been
completed, the president of one of the parties insisted that each party sign the asset
purchase agreement before he left the country for an extended vacation. Id. at *2. Subse-
quently, each party executed the asset purchase agreement without the schedules attached.
Id. At trial, it was disputed whether counsel for both parties had agreed that although the
purchase agreement was to be signed, it would not become effective until the relevant
schedules were completed. Id. at *4. The appeals court affirmed the trial court decision
that the evidence conclusively established that the parties did in fact agree that the asset
purchase agreement would not become binding until completion of the schedules, notwith-
standing the fact that the agreement had been signed. Id. at *5.
157. See, e.g., Bio-Medical Applications of Texas, Inc. v. Medical Mgmt., P.A., 198 F.
Supp. 2d 849 (E.D. Tex. 2002); ASI Techs., Inc. v. Johnson Equip. Co., 75 S.W.3d 545 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied); Cone v. Fagadau Energy Corp., 68 S.W.3d 147(Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, pet. denied); Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 63
S.W.3d 537 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. granted).
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language as a matter of law.158 The objective intent of the parties as ex-
pressed in the writing controls the contract's interpretation and the con-
tract must be enforced as written.159 In construing a contract, a court
should consider each part with every other part and presume the parties
intend every clause to have some effect.' 60 As one court this Survey pe-
riod firmly stated:
Parties to the contract are considered masters of their own choices.
They are entitled to select what terms and provisions to include in a
contract before executing it. And, in so choosing, each is entitled to
rely upon the words selected to demarcate their respective obliga-
tions and rights. In short, the parties strike the deal they choose to
strike and, thus, voluntarily bind themselves in the manner they
choose . . . a deal is a deal. 161
However, this Survey period also brought forth a startling case that seems
to endanger such oft-repeated legal principles, and in effect, should cause
corporate attorneys to reconsider if they have taken such principles for
granted.
DRC Parts & Accessories, L.L.C. v. VM Motori, S.P.A. 162 involved a
dispute by two contracting parties over the interpretation of a seemingly
unambiguous word in an agreement. 163 VM Motori, S.P.A. ("VM"), an
Italian manufacturer and seller of industrial diesel engines, contracted
158. See, e.g., International Turbine Servs., Inc. v. VASP Brazilian Airlines, 278 F.3d
494 (5th Cir. 2002); Gonzales v. Columbia Hosp. at Medical City Dallas Subsidiary, L.P.,
207 F. Supp. 2d 570 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Petrocon Eng'g, Inc. v. MAC Equip., Inc., 199 F.
Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Tex. 2002); Decorative Ctr. of Houston, L.P. v. Direct Response
Publ'ns, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 719 (S.D. Tex. 2002); City of Ranger v. Morton Valley Water
Supply Corp., 79 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet. denied); CU Lloyd's of Texas
v. Main Street Homes, Inc., 79 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.); Farmers &
Merchs. State Bank of Krum v. Reece Supply Co., 79 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2002, pet. denied); O'Kehie v. Harris Leasing Co., 80 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2002, no pet.); State v. Japage P'ship, 80 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2002,
no pet.); W.W. Laubach Trust/Georgetown Corp. v. Georgetown Corp./W.W. Laubach
Trust, 80 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied).
159. See, e.g., Geosouthern Energy Corp. v. Chesapeake Operating Inc., 274 F.3d 1017
(5th Cir. 2001); Santleben v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 752 (S.D. Tex. 2001); In
re Thornburg, 277 BR. 719 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2002); Hance, Scarborough, Wright, Gins-
berg & Brusilow, L.L.P. v. Kincaid, 70 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, pet. de-
nied); Faust v. Pumpco, Inc., 57 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied);
Jameston Partners, L.P. v. City of Fort Worth, 83 S.W.3d 376 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002,
pet. denied); Sabre Oil & Gas Corp. v. Gibson, 72 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002,
pet. denied); EOG Res., Inc. v. Hanson Prod. Co., 94 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, no pet.); State Farm Lloyds v. Durbin, No. 05-00-02108-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas
March 15, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 398801.
160. See, e.g., Hollomon v. 0. Mustad & Sons, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 450 (E.D. Tex.
2002); Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Young, 85 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 2002, no pet.); Snyder v. Cowell, No. 08-01-00186-CV (Tex. App.-El Paso Jan.
10, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 27105.
161. ASI Techs., Inc. v. Johnson Equip. Co., 75 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (citing Cross Timbers Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp., 22 S.W.3d 24, 26
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (emphasis added)).
162. DRC Parts & Accessories, L.L.C. v. VM Motori, S.P.A., No. 14-01-00507-CV, 2002
WL 31318550 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], Oct. 17, 2002, no pet.).
163. Id. at *1.
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with DRC Parts and Accessories, L.L.C. ("DRC") to purchase and dis-
tribute its products in North America.164 VM was later purchased by an
American company with an extensive network of representatives, and
thus the need for VM to contract with DRC decreased substantially. 165
However, due to the two parties' long history, VM sought to continue its
relationship with DRC and subsequently, both entered into a new agree-
ment.166 The agreement stated, "VM ... grants on a non-exclusive basis
... [to] DRC... the right to purchase and sell VM [products]."' 167 There-
after, DRC filed suit against VM for breach of contract, alleging that the
contract had in fact given it an exclusive right to sell DRC products.168 In
the alternative, DRC alleged that if the contract did only grant DRC a
non-exclusive right, VM had committed fraud in inducing DRC to enter
into the contract by misrepresenting that DRC's right would be exclu-
sive. 169 After the trial court granted DRC's motion for summary judg-
ment in its favor, VM appealed to the Houston Court of Appeals. 170
The court of appeals began its analysis by stating that DRC was argu-
ing that there existed two reasonable interpretations for the term "non-
exclusive:" one interpretation defining the term to mean non-exclusive,
while the other interpretation defined the term to mean exactly the oppo-
site-exclusive. 17' Obviously, the court disagreed with DRC's proposi-
tion. 172 Noting that in order for an ambiguity to exist in a contract, both
interpretations must be reasonable, 173 the appeals court found that under
the plain language of the agreement, DRC was not an exclusive dealer of
VM products. 74 Accordingly, VM did not breach the agreement.1 75 So
far, so good. Unfortunately, the appeals court did not end its analysis
with that simple conclusion.
In the alternative, DRC also alleged that it had been fraudulently in-
duced to enter into the agreement by VM falsely representing that the
agreement actually gave DRC an exclusive right.176 In response, VM,
relying on case law support, asserted that fraud can never be predicated
on alleged misrepresentations that conflict with the written terms of a
contract.' 77 After chronicling case law on fraud in the inducement, the
appeals court shockingly concluded that notwithstanding the clarity of the








171. Id. at *1, *3.
172. Id. at *3.
173. Id. (citing Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex.
1995); Glover v. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters, 545 S.W.2d 755, 761 (Tex. 1977)).
174. See DRC, 2002 WL 31318550, at *3.
175. Id.
176. Id. at *1.
177. Id. at *4 (citing Town North Nat'l Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1978)).
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issue as to whether DRC was fraudulently induced and reversed the trial
court's decision. 178
The appeals court first admitted that without the long-established prin-
ciple that extrinsic evidence is not admissible when a contract is clear on
its face, 179 "the solemnity of contracts would be extinguished."1 80 How-
ever, the court continued, "where one party's assent is induced by decep-
tion, no contract exists because there has been no mutuality of
agreement."' 8 And, because such fraud can only be shown by extrinsic
evidence, such evidence is thus admissible. 82
Distinguishing the instant case from Town North National Bank v.
Broaddus,183 a Texas Supreme Court case that cited to an appellate case,
which warned that the admissibility of extrinsic evidence would "destroy
the parol evidence rule['s ban on the admissibility of such evidence] alto-
gether,"'184 the Houston Court of Appeals noted that DRC was asserting
fraud as a cause of action in which a plaintiff seeks tort damages; DRC
was not asserting fraud as an affirmative defense in which a plaintiff seeks
to vary the terms of a contract.' 85 In effect, the parol evidence rule would
not be directly implicated, as "the legal duty not to fraudulently procure a
contract is separate and independent from the duties established by the
178. Id. at *6. But see Suttles v. Kastleman, No. 03-01-00719-CV (Tex. App.-Austin
July 26, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 1729519; Carter v. Plano
Prairie Partners, Ltd., No. 05-01-00179-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 30, 2002, no pet.) (not
designated for publication), 2002 WL 775033 (both decisions decided during this Survey
period affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment against the party seeking a
claim of fraudulent inducement).
179. See DRC, 2002 WL 31318550, at *4 (citing Marburger v. Seminole Pipeline Co.,
957 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id. (citing Marburger, 957 S.W.2d at 86).
183. Town North Nat'l Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1978).
184. Mitcham v. London, 110 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, no writ).
In Town North, the plaintiff sued three co-makers for recovery on a promissory note.
Town North, 569 S.W.2d at 490. Two of the co-makers alleged that they were fraudulently
induced into signing the note by the plaintiff's representation so that it would look solely to
the third co-maker for payment of the loan. Id. at 490-491. Relying upon the appellate
case Mitcham v. London, the Texas Supreme Court held that extrinsic evidence of fraud is
admissible to avoid a promissory note only when the evidence shows "some sort of trick,
artifice or device was employed by the payee in addition to his representation to the maker
that he would not be liable." Town North, 569 S.W.3d at 493. Because Town North in-
volved a promissory note and the fraud at issue was asserted as an affirmative defense, the
DRC court distinguished Town North as "narrow" and thus inapplicable to the facts of
DRC. DRC, 2002 WL 31318550, at *5.
185. See also Suttles v. Kastleman, No. 03-01-00719-CV (Tex. App.-Austin July 26,
2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 1729519; Carter v. Piano Prairie
Partners, Ltd., No. 05-01-00179-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 30, 2002, no pet.) (not desig-
nated for publication), 2002 WL 775033 (both cases decided during this Survey period in
which the defendants asserted fraudulent inducement as an affirmative defense); cf. John v.
Marshall Health Servs., Inc., 91 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. filed); Co-
lumbia v. Cottey, 72 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.) (both cases decided this
Survey period in which the plaintiff alleged fraudulent inducement as a cause of action).
1418 [Vol. 56
CORPORATIONS
contract itself."'1 86 Thus, parol evidence could be properly admitted. 187
Subsequently, the court of appeals found sufficient evidence in the form
of letters, memoranda, and affidavit testimony that raised a fact issue as
to whether DRC was fraudulently induced by VM to execute the
agreement. 188
Judge Edelman wrote a dissenting opinion which encapsulates the ar-
guments on why this case was wrongly decided. 189 These arguments, with
which the authors agree, are summarized as follows: The appeals court
essentially concludes that a claim of fraudulent inducement in which a
plaintiff relies on a statement that directly contradicts the plain language
of contract overrides such plain language. 190 In coming to this conclu-
sion, the appeals court forgets that one of the elements of a fraud claim is
that the plaintiff has to actually and justifiably rely on the alleged misrep-
resentation.' 9' This is because a party to an arm's length transaction, as
most every corporate agreement is, is presumed to exercise ordinary care
and reasonable diligence and the failure to do so is not an excuse to al-
lege fraud. 192 In the instant case, it is difficult for the authors to ascertain
how DRC would be justified in relying on VM's alleged misrepresenta-
tion when the language of the agreement was so apparent and
unambiguous.
The principle that in the absence of trickery or deceit, reliance on a
misrepresentation that directly contradicts the express terms of a written
agreement is not justified, and thus cannot support a claim for fraud in
the inducement, has been clearly articulated by the Texas Supreme
Court.193 As the DRC dissent notes, this principle is also supported by
practical considerations and ignoring it only results in a questionable en-
vironment for any corporate practitioner:
If, as the majority holds, a claim for fraudulent inducement can lie
where the alleged misrepresentation directly contradicts the written
contract, then the contract ceases to establish the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties and instead merely provides a mechanism to hold
a party liable for complying with it as well as not complying with it.
Under those circumstances, what is the use of entering into written
contracts at all, or for that matter, providing courts for the purpose
186. DRC, 2002 WL 31318550, at *5 (citing Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio
Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tex. 1998)).
187. Id.
188. Id. The requirements for a fraud cause of action are: (1) a material misrepresenta-
tion that is false, (2) the misrepresentation was either known to be false when made or was
asserted without knowledge of its truth, (3) the misrepresentation was intended to be acted
upon, (4) the misrepresentation was in fact relied upon, and (5) the misrepresentation
caused injury. See Formosa Plastics, 960 S.W.2d at 47.
189. See DRC, 2002 WL 31318550, at *7 (Edelman, R., dissenting).
190. See id.
191. See id. (citing Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577
(Tex. 2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977)).
192. See DRC, 2002 WL 31318550, at *7 (citing Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 251
(Tex. 1962)).
193. Id. (citing Town North Nat'l Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1978)).
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of not enforcing, and thereby defeating, them? 194
Even though the majority of the Houston Court of Appeals seems to
negate well-established contract law concepts, buried at the end of its
opinion lies good advice, or at least a reminder, for corporate attorneys.
Although the court concludes that the merger clause contained in the
DRC agreement did not waive a claim of fraudulent inducement, 195 it
states in dicta that a proper "release that clearly expresses the parties'
intent to waive fraudulent inducement claims, or one that disclaims reli-
ance on representations about specific matters in dispute, can preclude a
claim of fraudulent inducement. ' 196 Therefore, when negotiating corpo-
rate agreements t 97 practitioners should remember to include an explic-
itly-stated waiver and disclaimer to minimize the risk that the other party
will later assert a claim based on something that goes beyond the four
194. Id.
195. See id. at *6. The merger clause in DRC provides: "The present agreement substi-
tutes and invalidates any other former agreement." Id.
196. Id. (citing Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171,181 (Tex. 1997)).
In Schlumberger, the Texas Supreme Court found the following facts to be significant in
concluding that the release provision at issue was effective to disclaim fraudulent induce-
ment: (1) the parties were dealing in an arm's length transaction, (2) both parties were
represented by highly competent legal counsel during the negotiations for the terms of the
release itself, (3) both parties were knowledgeable and sophisticated business players, and
(4) the terms of the release "in clear language ... unequivocally disclaimed reliance."
Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 180.
197. Regarding the law of contractually disclaiming fraudulent inducement claims, both
the New York and Delaware courts have arrived at similar conclusions. New York law
holds that a clause, which states that the party has not relied on any statement or represen-
tation not in the contract. prevents an allegation of fraud in the inducement. See Danann
Realty Corp. v. Harris, 57 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1959). In a more recent case, Morse Diesel,
Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., No. 86 CIV. 1494 (PKL), 1990 WL 52266 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 19, 1990), a federal court cited Danann while stating that "[i]t has long been the law in
New York State that a party may not allege fraudulent misrepresentation or inducement,
where there is a specific disclaimer of reliance." Id. at *3. Moreover, the court noted that
under the Danann rule, parol evidence is not admissible in the face of an explicit disclaimer
clause. Id. at *4. However, because Danann had "been criticized as encouraging the use of
boilerplate language in contract formation," New York's highest court had recently
"moved away from the rigid requirement that plaintiff's disclaimer of reliance be explicit
... [and instead,] has looked to the contract relationship as a whole to determine if the
plaintiff, by words or actions, has disclaimed reliance." Id. In effect, this has led to a more
liberal interpretation of Danann. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Plapinger, 485 N.E.2d 974
(N.Y. 1985) (holding that a plaintiff could not allege fraudulent inducement to a contract,
which explicitly stated that the guarantee contained therein was "absolute and uncondi-
tional"); Bonda v. LNR Props., 547 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding that
where, at the time of contract formation, plaintiff had refused to permit inclusion of a
specific representation into the contract, plaintiff could not later maintain an action for
fraudulent misrepresentation on that same information). Delaware has found certain fac-
tors, similar to the ones listed in Texas' Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d 171, persuasive in con-
cluding that explicit contract disclaimers can bar fraudulent inducement claims. See Great
Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Pharmacia Corp., 788 A.2d 544 (Del. Ch. 2001). In Great Lakes, the
Delaware Court of Chancery noted that even though there existed Delaware cases which
prohibited the use of contract disclaimers to absolve claims of fraud, those cases were
distinguishable in that each involved "simple real estate contracts having boilerplate, un-
negotiated disclaimer language." Id. at 555 (citing Norton v. Poplos, 443 A.2d 1 (Del.
1982)). In contrast, Great Lakes involved "two highly sophisticated parties, assisted by
industry consultants and experienced legal counsel, [who] entered into carefully negotiated
disclaimer language after months of extensive due diligence." Id.
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corners of the contract. 198 Practitioners should especially do so when at
least one Texas court is willing to validate such claims.199
C. SPECIAL CORPORATE CONTRACT INTERPRETATION ISSUES
1. Interpretation of Best Efforts Clauses: Herrmann Holdings, Ltd. v.
Lucent Technologies, Inc.
When parties seeking to enter into an agreement cannot quite define
certain obligations to one another, often corporate counsel suggest lan-
guage like "best efforts" to assist in characterizing the parties' duties. Al-
though the term "best efforts" is obviously indefinite,20° it is frequently
198. See, e.g., Shell Oil Prods. Co. v. Main St. Ventures, L.L.C., 90 S.W.3d 375 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2002, pet. abated); John v. Marshall Health Servs., Inc., 91 S.W.3d 446 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied). In this Survey period's, Shell Oil, the Dallas Court of
Appeals, distinguishing the situation in which a party enters into a binding contract which
specifically cautions against relying on verbal statements which contradict the agreement,
concluded that the following language in a non-binding letter of intent did not preclude a
plaintiff's claim of fraud: "[O]nly the representations and warranties and other terms and
conditions of the [definitive agreement], when, as and if executed and delivered, would
have any legal effect .... At any time prior to the execution of the [definitive agreement],
either party may terminate negotiations without incurring any obligation whatsoever to the
other party." Shell Oil, 90 S.W.3d at 382. Similarly, John, also decided this Survey period,
involved a defendant in a fraudulent inducement action seeking to rely on the following
contract provision as a disclaimer: "This Agreement ... constitute[s] the entire agreement
between the parties regarding the subject matter thereof and supercede[s] all prior contem-
poraneous discussions, representations, correspondence and agreements, [ ] whether oral
or written, pertaining thereto." John, 2002 WL 31487882, at *2. The court found the lan-
guage to be too unspecific and "more like 'boilerplate' contract language," and thus, the
plaintiff had not disclaimed or released any claim for fraudulent inducement. Id. at *3.
Compare this result to Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d 171, in which the Texas Supreme Court
concluded that the following disclaimer of reliance was binding and, as a matter of law,
precluded a claim of fraudulent inducement: [Plaintiffs] release all
causes of action of whatsoever nature, or any other legal theory arising out of
circumstances [regarding the parties' disagreement (in this case, the valua-
tion of a certain joint venture)], from any and all liability damages of any
kind known or unknown, whether in contract or tort . . . . [Plaintiffs] ex-
pressly warrant[ ] and represent[ ] and do[ ] hereby state ... and represent
.. . that no promise or agreement which is not herein expressed has been
made to him or her in executing this release, and that none of us is relying
upon any statement or representation of any agent of the parties being released
hereby. Each of us is relying on his or her own judgment and each has been
represented by ... legal counsel in this matter. The aforesaid legal counsel
has read and explained to each of us the entire cz'atents of this Release in
Full, as well as the legal consequences of this Release.
Id. at 180 (emphasis in original).
199. Another case decided recently, Joppich v. 1464-Eight, Ltd., No. 01-01-00742-CV,
2002 WL 31837868 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] December 19, 2002, pet. filed), simi-
larly seems to endanger long-established contract interpretation principles. In Joppich, the
Houston Court of Appeals concluded that a recital of acknowledgment of consideration
received, such as "In consideration of the sum of ten dollars, the receipt and sufficiency of
which is hereby acknowledged and confessed," operated as "no more than a statement of
fact, which may be contradicted by parol evidence." Id. at *3. But see Herrmann v. Lind-
sey, No. 04-02-00184-CV, 2003 WL 354464 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Feb. 19, 2003) (un-
like contract principles, grantor of deed has no right of rescission based upon a total or
partial failure of consideration).
200. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Lake Park v. Gay, 694 So. 2d 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997). In Florida's First Nat'l Bank, plaintiff lessee sued defendant lessor for failing to use
its "best efforts" to induce another tenant to terminate its lease early. Id. at 787. When
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used without further definition or clarification other than the insertion of
terms such as "reasonable" or "commercially reasonable" in an effort to
avoid a construction of "best efforts" that would require an unlimited
expenditure of funds or the incurrence of a severe loss to fulfill the
duty.20
Among the various states, the majority rule is to enforce "best efforts"
clauses.202 However, determining what "best efforts" entails varies
greatly from court to court.20 3 Even the seminal Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing
submitting its jury charge, the plaintiff sought to define "best efforts" with a standard that
the trial judge quickly rejected as too demanding. Id. (The judge commented that "the
way [the jury instruction" reads, you would almost think the [lessor has] to take an UZI
submachine gun and go down there and say 'end this lease[!]. Id.) The Florida appellate
court recognized that "[tihe definition of 'best efforts' may vary depending upon the fac-
tual circumstances surrounding the transaction and the intent of the parties in entering into
the transaction." Id. at 788.
201. See, e.g., In re Heard, 6 B.R. 876 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980); 407 East 61st Garage,
Inc. v. Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp., 244 N.E.2d 37 (N.Y. 1968). Notwithstanding the common
fear of the corporate attorney that "best efforts" requires the promisor to spend itself into
bankruptcy, few cases have in fact found the standard to require such extreme actions, and
most find the standard to be based on an obligation to act in good faith under the particu-
lar circumstances. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 198 B.R. 848, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
aff'd 108 F.3d 1369 (2d Cir. 1997) (A party is entitled to give "reasonable consideration to
its own interests" in determining an appropriate course of action to reach the desired re-
sult); Triple-A Baseball Club Assocs. v. Northeastern Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214, 227-28
(1st Cir. 1987) ("We have found no cases, and none have been cited, holding that "best
efforts" means every conceivable effort.); W. Geophysical Co. of Am. v. Bolt Assocs., Inc.,
584 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1978) (Parties may exercise discretion, within their good faith judg-
ment, in devising a strategy for achieving their ultimate goal.); Perma Research & Dev. Co.
v. Singer Co., 308 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Arnold Prods., Inc. v. Favorite Films,
Corp., 176 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affd 298 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1962). However, more
recent cases have leaned toward concluding that "best efforts" is a more precise and higher
standard than "good faith," although how much higher varies from court to court, and
"whether such obligation has been fulfilled will almost invariably.., involve a question of
fact." Kroboth v. Brent, 215 A.D.2d 813, 814 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); see, e.g., Nat'l Data
Payment Sys., Inc. v. Meridian Bank, 212 F.3d 849, 854 (3d Cir. 2000) ("The duty of best
efforts 'has diligence as its essence' and is 'more exacting' than the usual contractual duty
of good faith.") (citing E. Allan Farnsworth, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRAC's 383-84 (2d ed.
1998); T.S.I. Holdings, Inc. v. Jenkins, 924 P.2d 1239, 1250 (Kan. 1996) ("The two standards
[of good faith and best efforts] are distinct and that of best efforts is the more exacting,
though it presumably falls short of the standard required of a fiduciary . . ."); Satellite
Broad. Cable, Inc. v. Telefonica De Espana, 807 F. Supp. 210, 217 (D.P.R. 1992) (effect of
the particular "best efforts" clause at issue is to expand "beyond a mere good faith require-
ment"); Kroboth, 215 A.D.2d at 814 ("'Best efforts' requires more than 'good faith,' which
is an implied covenant in all contracts ... best efforts requires that plaintiffs pursue all
reasonable methods...").
202. See James M. Van Vliet, Jr., "Best Efforts" Promises Under Illinois Law, 88 ILL.
B.J. 698 (2000). The minority view tends to conclude that promises to use best efforts are
illusory. See E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best
Efforts in Contract Law, 46 U. Purr. L. REV. 1 (1984). An example of such a state is
Illinois. In Illinois, a promise to use "best efforts," without more, is too vague to create a
binding contractual obligation. See, e.g., Krafco Corp. v. Kolbus, 274 N.E.2d 153 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1971). However, if the parties have defined what constitutes "best efforts," the "best
efforts" promise is enforceable. See, e.g., Heritage Remediation / Eng'g, Inc. v.
Wendnagel, No. 89C413, 1989 WL 153373 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 1989).
203. See J.C. Bruno, "Best Efforts"-More or Less, 14 Micii. Bus. L.J. 1 (1991). Even
the method in which courts seek to determine what "best efforts" means is varied. Courts
have generally responded in one of two ways. The first is to imagine the parties united as a
single person and to ask what efforts a reasonable person in that situation would exert on
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Corp.,204 does little to add clarity to the uncertain issue of what "best
efforts" means. 205 Thus, when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opted
to hear Herrmann Holdings, Ltd. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.,206 a case
which involved a "best efforts" provision, it was an opportunity to shed
light on the murky phrase.
On June 16, 2000, Lucent and the Herrmanns, the owners of Herrmann
Technology, Inc. ("HTI"), signed a merger agreement in which Lucent
acquired HTI for 6,770,200 shares of Lucent stock.207 But because the
Herrmanns would be unable to sell their Lucent stock on the open mar-
ket until Lucent filed a Form S-3 registration statement with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the SEC subsequently
declared it effective, a specific provision in the merger agreement was
included to address this issue:
Lucent shall use its reasonable best efforts20 8 to prepare, file and
cause to become effective, as promptly as practicable after Lucent
shall have received all relevant information to be provided by [HTI]
or [the Herrmanns] in connection with such filing, the Registration
Statement covering the public resale of such shares of Lucent Com-
mon Stock to be issued in connection with the Merger . . .
Agreement. 20 9
Another provision in the merger agreement similarly obligated Lucent to:
use its reasonable best efforts to take or cause to be taken all actions,
and to do, or cause to be done, all things necessary, proper or advisa-
ble under applicable Law to consummate and make effective in the
his own behalf. See Farnsworth, supra note 202, at 9. The second interpretation of what
constitutes "best efforts" is to imagine a third person to be in the place of the party who
has promised to act with "best efforts" and to ask what efforts a reasonable person in that
situation would exert. See id.
204. Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979). Falstaff bought most
of the assets of Ballantine, a regional beer brewer, and explicitly agreed to "use its best
efforts to promote and maintain a higher volume of sales" so that the owner of Ballantine
could receive royalties. Id. at 610. Subsequently, another owner took control of Falstaff
and began cutting costs. Sales of Ballantine greatly decreased and the royalties of Ballan-
tine's former owner decreased. Id. at 611-12. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's
finding that Falstaff had breached the "best efforts" provision. Id. at 616.
205. As Allan Farnsworth has noted, because the defendant in Bloor "fell so far short
of the mark," little precision was added to the definition of "best efforts." Farnsworth,
supra note 202, at 11.
206. Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2002).
207. Id. at 556. Based on the closing price of $60 that day, the Herrmanns' newly ac-
quired shares were worth approximately $438 million. id.
208. "Reasonable best efforts" was defined in the merger agreement to mean "prompt,
substantial and persistent efforts as a prudent Person desirous of achieving a result would
use in similar circumstances; provided that [the parties involved], as applicable, shall be
required to expend only such resources as are commercially reasonable in the applicable
circumstances." Id. at 557. While there are no cases that directly analyze the difference
between "best efforts" and "reasonable best efforts," the phrases should not be interpreted
interchangeably. See, e.g., Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cynamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 538
(2d Cir. 1974) (in the context of a "reasonable best efforts" clause, the Second Circuit
concludes that the word "reasonably" must add some meaning to the concept of "best
efforts").
209. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
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most expeditious manner practicable, the transactions contemplated
by [the merger] Agreement including ... the making of all necessary
registrations and filing and the taking of all reasonable steps as may
be necessary to obtain an approval or waiver from, or to avoid an
action or proceeding by any governmental or regulatory authority.210
Eleven days after the HTI acquisition, Lucent's counsel asked the
Herrmanns whether it was acceptable to delay the filing of the HTI S-3
for a few weeks because Lucent was acquiring another much larger tele-
communications company, and Lucent wished to combine the two fil-
ings.21' The Herrmanns responded in the negative and instructed Lucent
to proceed as originally planned.212 A few days later, Lucent sent the
Herrmanns questionnaires seeking information for preparing the S-3 re-
gistration statement, and although the Herrmanns had already provided
this information before closing, they resent the information to Lucent a
few days later.2 13 More telephone calls from the Herrmanns inquiring
about the status of the S-3 followed.2 14
On July 20, 2000, Lucent reported disappointing third quarter
financials and lowered its fourth quarter estimates.2 15 The next day, Lu-
cent sent the Herrmanns a draft of the registration statement for their
review. 216 Surprisingly, the draft showed that Lucent had combined the
registration of shares from the HTI acquisition and the other latter acqui-
sition.217 Six weeks after the HTI acquisition, on July 28, 2000, Lucent
filed the combined S-3 registration statement and on August 7, 2000, the
SEC declared the S-3 effective.2 18
The Herrmanns bought suit against Lucent in federal court for various
claims, including breach of contract, specifically alleging that Lucent
failed to use its reasonable best efforts to file and cause to become effec-
tive the registration statement as required by the merger agreement. 219
With Judge Fish of the Northern District of Texas presiding, the court
began by stating that Texas law governed the case. 220 However, because
there existed no Texas Supreme Court precedent on the enforceability of
best effort clauses in a breach of contract action, the court would instead
defer to the Dallas Court of Appeals decision CKB & Associates, Inc. v.
210. Id. (emphasis added).




215. Id. The poor news caused Lucent's stock price to fall from $64.50 to $54.31. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. That day, Lucent stock closed at $42.06. Id.
219. See Herrmann Holdings, Ltd. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. Civ. A. 301CV0625G,
2001 WL 1295496 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2001).
220. Id. at *3. Since the court's jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, the




Moore McCormack Petroleum, Inc., 2 2 1 which held that "to be enforcea-
ble, a best efforts contract must set some kind of goal or guideline against
which best efforts may be measured. '222 If such guideline exists, then the
"contracting party that performs within [such] guidelines fulfills the con-
tract regardless of the quality of its efforts. '223
The district court analogized that in the instant case, the one and only
goal established in the merger agreement was for Lucent to file and cause
to become effective a registration statement covering the Herrmann's
shares.224 Because the parties never specified a particular date in which
the task was to be completed, the district court concluded that Lucent
met this goal by in fact filing the S-3 and causing it to become effective,
and thus successfully "discharge[d] its obligations under the [agreement]
regardless of the quality of its efforts. ' 225 The district court ended its
analysis by stating that in considering whether a goal in a contract has
been accomplished, the law in Texas does not have a court inquire into
the "circumstance of the case or to comparable performances. '226 Be-
cause the only objective goal was successful registration, and Lucent satis-
fied that goal, the analysis of whether there is a breach of contract should
end.2 27 Judge Fish subsequently granted Lucent's motion to dismiss all of
the Herrmanns' claims and entered final judgment for Lucent. 22 8 On ap-
peal, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, with Judge Stewart
delivering the opinion, concluded that dismissing the Herrmann's con-
tract case would be premature and thus reversed the district court's
holding.22 9
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by agreeing with the district court's
reliance on the CKB framework.2 30 However, it took issue with the dis-
trict court's narrow reading of the phrase "some kind of goal or guide-
line" that is required to enforce a best efforts clause under CKB.231 The
Fifth Circuit disagreed with the proposition that because there lacked a
specific due date in the agreement, the language "as promptly as practica-
ble" and "in the most expeditious manner practicable" would essentially
have to be written out of the contract. 232 The district court's conclusion
221. CKB & Assocs., Inc. v. Moore McCormack Petroleum, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
222. Id. at 581-82. Accord Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 893 S.W.2d 92,
103-04 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) ("[T]he words 'good faith effort'
or 'best effort' are not talismanic; their presence in an agreement does not automatically
mean that the provision which contains them is enforceable.").
223. Herrmann (N.D. Tex.), 2001 WL 1295496, at *3 (citing CKB, 809 S.W.2d at 582).





229. Herrmann (5th Cir.), 302 F.3d at 561.
230. Id. at 559.
231. Id.
232. Id. The Fifth Circuit concluded that neither CKB nor any other Texas case sup-
ports the position that in a case where the best efforts clause relates to timeliness or the
time that a task must be completed, the goal or guideline must be date specific. See id. at
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would render the language of the agreement meaningless, which is con-
trary to the principle that courts should give significance to each clause in
a contract.23
3
After citing to case law from other jurisdictions which analyzed similar
language,2 34 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the true goal established by
the best efforts provision was for Lucent to file and cause to become ef-
fective "as promptly as practical" and "in the most expeditious manner
practicable" a registration statement covering the Herrmann's shares.235
Thus, because the Herrmanns alleged that Lucent had not timely filed the
registration statement, there existed a valid breach of contract claim
which the district court had prematurely dismissed.2 36
In upholding the Herrmann's claim, the Fifth Circuit in effect gave
credence to the belief held by those who draft agreements that courts
should always seek to interpret contracts as written. There is meaning
and intent behind every word of an agreement. However, although the
Fifth Circuit's decision validates the enforceability of "best efforts"
clauses, it is nonetheless important for contracting parties who desire to
include a "best efforts" clause to continue to define as precisely as possi-
ble what level of performance they intend, such as using qualifiers like
"as promptly as practical" and "in the most expeditious manner practica-
ble" as the Herrmann Holdings parties did. Only by further defining
what constitutes "best efforts" can parties adequately assure that their
intention will be understood by each other, and more importantly, en-
forced by the courts.
560. As the Fifth Circuit states, "[r]equiring contracting parties to fix a date certain in
order to set a temporal guideline in which to complete a certain task demands more defi-
niteness than Texas law requires." Id.
233. See id. at 559-60 (citing Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 972 S.W.2d 738, 741
(Tex. 1998) ("Our primary goal ... is to give effect to the written expression of the parties'
intent. We must read all parts of the contract together, striving to give meaning to every
sentence, clause, and work to avoid rendering any portion inoperative.")).
234. Among the cases that the Fifth Circuit cited was Thomas De La Rue AG v. United
States Banknote Corp., 979 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In Thomas, the United States
Banknote Corp. ("Banknote") acquired a company, transferring Banknote stock to
Thomas De La Rue AG ("TDLR") as part of consideration for the sale, and agreed that,
upon TDLR's written request that Banknote register the shares, it "would prepare and file
the registration statement 'as expeditiously as possible and would thereafter use its 'best
efforts' to cause the registration statement to become effective." Id. at 970. Banknote did
not file the registration statement until nearly six months after the TDLR's written request
for registration. Id. The TDLR sued Banknote for breach of contract, and upon TDLR's
motion for partial summary judgment, the court held that the registration provision at issue
was not ambiguous. Id. at 972. Instead, it imposed an obligation on Banknote "to act as
expeditiously as reasonably possible under the circumstances." Id. Since there were genu-
ine issues of material fact which existed as to whether Banknote in fact did act as the
contract required, it was for a jury to decide whether the delay was a breach of Banknote's
obligations under the contract. Id. at 972-73.




2. Interpretation of Employee Stock Option Agreements: Monsanto Co.
v. Boustany
During this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court reversed an ap-
pellate court decision which was discussed in the Corporations Survey
three years ago. 237 In Monsanto Co. v. Boustany,2 38 employees of Fisher
Controls International, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Monsanto
Company, were granted options to purchase Monsanto stock as part of an
incentive and compensation plan.239 Pursuant to an agreement governed
by Delaware law, such options would expire ten years from the date that
they were granted or upon termination of employment, whichever oc-
curred first.2 40 Subsequently, another company fully acquired the Fisher
subsidiary from Monsanto; however, employees of Fisher continued their
employment and retained their positions.241
Four years after the sale of Fisher and within the ten-year vesting win-
dow, certain Fisher employees sought to exercise their Monsanto stock
options, some priced as low as $44, as Monsanto stock had dramatically
risen to almost $160 per share.242 Not surprisingly, Monsanto refused to
honor the options, 243 and in response, 110 Fisher employees sought judi-
cial remedy.244 The plaintiffs sued their employer's former parent for va-
ried claims, including breach of contract, claiming that the refusal of
Monsanto to honor their stock options was wrongful.2 45 The case hinged
on one issue: whether the sale of Fisher to another company constituted a
"termination of employment," which in turn would determine whether
Monsanto had rightfully refused the plaintiffs' option exercise.
As highlighted in the year 2000 Corporations Survey, 246 the Houston
Court of Appeals used plain-meaning construction to declare that the
sale of Fisher was simply a change of control and ownership of a subsidi-
ary, and not at all a termination of the plaintiffs' employment when they
237. Id. West & Fairman, supra note 4, at 783 (discussing the state appellate decision).
238. See Monsanto Co. v. Boustany, 73 S.W.3d 225 (Tex. 2002).
239. Monsanto, 73 S.W.3d at 227.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 228. The options ranged in price from $44.312 per share to $67.125 per
share. Id. During the year after Monsanto sold Fisher, Monsanto's stock had only reached
a high of $66.25. Thereafter, up until the time that the employees sought to exercise their
options, Monsanto stock continued to increase in value. Id.
243. Id. Immediately after the sale of Fisher, Monsanto's compensation committee had
concluded that a provision in the option certificates required options to be exercised within
three months after termination of employment by Monsanto. Id. at 227-28. However, the
market price of Monsanto stock was lower than the price that some of the stock options
could be exercised, which meant that the employees could not profitably exercise those
options within the three-month window. Id. at 228. Thus, the compensation committee
decided to extend the time for Fisher employees to exercise those options an additional
nine months. Id. Consequently, the employees were given one year after Monsanto sold
Fisher to exercise their stock options. Id. Monsanto's stock price rose above the various
option prices within that one-year window, and thus Fisher employees did have the oppor-
tunity to profitably exercise their options. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See West & Fairman, supra note 4, at 783.
2003] 1427
SMU LAW REVIEW
were "still employed by Fisher, in the same management positions per-
forming the same job tasks."'2 47 Thus, when faced with a situation seem-
ingly unaccounted for in the stock option agreement, the appeals court
reaffirmed the often-repeated principle that "[a] court may not, in the
guise of construing a contract, in effect rewrite it to supply an omission in
its provisions" and found for the plaintiffs.248 Confronted with paying
substantial damages, Monsanto appealed and the Texas Supreme Court,
with Justice Owen delivering the opinion, reversed the appeals court
decision. 24 9
Contrary to the court of appeals decision, the Texas Supreme Court
came to the conclusion that the sale of the Fisher subsidiary was in fact a
"termination of employment." The supreme court first stated familiar
contract principles: "An agreement should be read as a whole in discern-
ing the parties' intent and if possible, interpreted to reconcile all of the
provisions of the document. '2 5 0 "If no ambiguity is present, the Court
must give effect to the clear language. 251 The supreme court then began
its analysis by tracing through the governing stock option agreement to
determine the meaning of "termination of employment." The agreement
did not provide much guidance as it defined "termination of employ-
ment" as "the discontinuance of employment of [any employee of Mon-
santo or a Subsidiary to whom a stock option has been granted] for any
reason other than a Transfer.1252 However, the supreme court noted that
"Subsidiary" had two separate definitions depending on which type of
stock option an employee held: one definition, governing those options
which the plaintiffs did not possess, determined whether a company was a
Subsidiary at the time the option was granted; the other definition, gov-
erning those options which the plaintiffs did possess, had no such quali-
fier, meaning that a company could cease being a Subsidiary at anytime
during the term of the agreement.253 This distinction, the supreme court
247. Boustany v. Monsanto Co., 6 S.W.3d 596, 600 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1999, pet. granted).
248. Id. at 601.
249. See Monsanto (Tex.), 73 S.W.3d at 228-29.
250. Id. at 229 (citing Kaiser Alum. Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 395 (Del. 1996)).
251. Id. (citing Johnston v. Tally Ho, Inc., 303 A.2d 677, 679 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973)).
252. Id. at 230. The stock option agreement itself defined "termination of employ-
ment" to mean "the discontinuance of employment of a Participant for any reason other
than a Transfer." Id. Participant was defined as "an Eligible Participant to whom a Stock
Option has been granted." Id. "Eligible Participants" were defined as "any employee of
the Company, a Subsidiary or any Associated Company." Id. Transfer was defined as "a
change of employment of a Participant within the group consisting of the Company and its
Subsidiaries." Id. at 231.
253. Id. at 230-31. Subsidiary was defined in the stock option agreement as follows:
for the purposes of an Incentive Stock Option, any corporation (other than
[Monsanto] in an unbroken chain of corporations beginning with [Monsanto]
if, at the time of the granting of the Option, each of the corporations other
than the last corporation in the unbroken chain owns stock possessing 50%
or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock in one of
the other corporations in such chain; and (ii) for the purposes of Non-Quali-
fied Stock Option . . . any corporation (or partnership, joint venture, or
other enterprise) of which [Monsanto] owns or controls, directly or indi-
[Vol. 561428
CORPORATIONS
concluded, meant that the moment Fisher ceased being controlled by
Monsanto, the plaintiffs also ceased being employees of a "Subsidiary,"
notwithstanding their continuance as employees of Fisher.254 In effect, a
"termination of employment" had occurred which allowed Monsanto to
refuse to honor the plaintiffs' stock options.255 The supreme court subse-
quently reversed the appeals court decision and found for Monsanto.256
As a practical matter, one of the main reasons companies provide stock
options is to provide an incentive to employees so that they may seek to
contribute to company value and growth. The desire by Monsanto for
such stock options to expire for Fisher employees after a change of own-
ership of Fisher is obvious. However, this intent was never clearly estab-
lished in the stock option agreement, and because of that litigation
ensued. 257 Although a favorable result for Monsanto was eventually
achieved, it is nevertheless important that corporate practitioners remem-
ber to articulate provisions with specificity, as the potential risk that the
contracting parties' intent will be wrongly interpreted by either judge or
jury can be great.258
rectly, 50% of more of the outstanding shares of stock normally entitled to
vote for the election of directors (or comparable equity participating and vot-
ing power).
Id. at 230 n.2.
254. Id. at 231.
255. Id. at 232.
256. Id. at 233.
257. See also Pers. Sec. & Safety Sys., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 297 F.3d 388 (5th Cir.
2002). Here, an arbitration provision was included in an ancillary agreement, but not the
main stock purchase agreement. Id. at 391. The plaintiff argued that a claim under the
stock purchase agreement was not subject to the arbitration provision because the intent of
the parties was for the arbitration provision to only apply to the ancillary agreement, and
not to govern the parties' entire relationship. Id. at 393-94. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed and concluded that "the individual agreements were integral and inter-
related parts of the one deal." Id. at 393.
258. This Survey period also brought a number of opportunities for the Texas courts to
remind corporate practitioners of both the express negligence and conspicuous indemnity
doctrines, which are the standards used by Texas courts to determine the validity of a
contractual clause that seeks to disclaim or indemnify a party from its own negligence.
Under the express negligence rule, a party who wishes to contractually shift risk from itself
for the consequences of its future negligence must specifically express that intent within
the four corners of an agreement. See Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705(Tex. 1987). Moreover, the conspicuous indemnity doctrine states that in order for an in-
demnity against one's own negligence to be effective, the indemnity agreement must pro-
vide conspicuous notice of the existence of that provision to draw the attention of the party
providing the indemnity. See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505
(Tex. 1993). This Survey period, the courts continued to implement the express negligence
rule in the context of indemnification provisions. See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Lely
Dev. Corp., 86 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. dism'd) (in reversing the trial
court decision, the court concluded appellee had actual knowledge of the indemnity provi-
sion in a construction contract); Banner Sign & Barricade, Inc. v. Price Constr., Inc. 94
S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (concluding that the inclusion of
the phrase "regardless of cause or of the sole, joint, comparative, concurrent negligence or
gross negligence" in a corporate officer indemnification provision satisfies the express neg-
ligence rule); Reyes v. Storage & Processors, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 344 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2002, pet. filed) (concluding that a release and indemnity provision in an employee benefit
plan was subject to the express negligence rule); DDD Energy, Inc. v. Veritas DGC Land,
Inc., 60 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (concluding that the
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provision at issue failed the express negligence test, and thus there was no need to reach
the conspicuous notice requirement). Another interesting case decided this Survey period
involving indemnification was Drilltec Technologies, Inc. v. Remp, 64 S.W.3d 212 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.), in which the Houston Court of Appeals, be-
cause of ambiguous drafting, "attempt[ed] to trace a right of indemnity through a corpo-
rate web that would make a spider dizzy." Id. at 213. The court ultimately concluded that
the indemnity had been transferred to the only party who actually needed it-the buyer
who bargained for indemnity as part of the purchase price. Id. at 216.
